

that military domination would involve commercial privilege, and that French public opinion would veto a serious offer. A Sultan who could only rule with foreign help was not the sovereign ruler envisaged by the Algeciras Act. Germany should resume full liberty of action, and follow up her declaration by sending cruisers to Mogador and Agadir. France would then offer compensation, and no storm was likely to arise. If she took it quietly, England would not make difficulties, and she might be told that Germany was ready for a deal if compensation in the French Congo were offered. The Chancellor accepted the plan, the Kaiser's assent was secured, and the *Panther* was ordered to Agadir.

Before the French Cabinet had time to consider Cambon's report on the Kissingen conversations the German Ambassador informed the Quai d'Orsay on July 1 that a gunboat had been sent to Agadir to defend German nationals and interests in that region. The *Panther's* spring, like the Tangier speech, ruined a sound legal case. Both countries, curiously enough, had repeated their mistakes of 1905. France pushed forward in Morocco without buying off German hostility, and Germany replied by banging her fist on the table. On July 9 Jules Cambon and Kiderlen began the conversations which were to continue for four months. Germany, it was understood, would give France a free hand in Morocco in return for compensation in the Congo*. When, however, the Foreign Minister suggested the cession of the French Congo, the French Government was alarmed, and Mr. Lloyd George intervened with the strident Mansion House threat. Kiderlen modified his demands, but he continued to ask more than France would consent to give. He had no desire for war, but he was not in the least afraid of playing with fire. " He who

announces in
advance that he will not fight can achieve nothing
in politics,"
he remarked,' and he had a stronger will than
either the Kaiser
or Bethmann. Early in September a financial
panic on the
Berlin *Bourse* revealed the acute tension. Despite
Germany's
superior military strength the Morocco-Congo
treaties signed
on November 4 were a triumph for France, who
rounded off
her African Empire at the price of an unhealthy
slice of the
tropics. The French case had been conducted
by Caillaux
and Jules Cambon with conspicuous firmness and
skill. The
German Colonial Minister, who had been
overruled, resigned
in disgust. The Chancellor's statements that the
Panther was
not sent to acquire territory and that South
Morocco was not a